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Žrtve i savremeni odgovori na kriminalitet
Victims of human rights violations  
and victims of human rights restrictions
ax el l e Re i t e R *
T
he purpose of international human rights law is to protect basic individual rights 
and provide to the victims of violations legal remedies against the authors of the 
abuses. One major difficulty faced in this context originates in the limiting clauses that 
states insert in international conventions. This paper looks at their compatibility with 
human rights agreements, in the view of strengthening the legal avenues open to the 
victims and the possibility for them to obtain redress. The crucial position of human rights 
at the core of the notion of international public order conditions the approach to adopt 
in relation to most issues that touch upon the scope and substance of protected rights, 
including withdrawal from treaties, reservations, implied limitations, overtly broad or 
inappropriate restrictions, misguided interpretations and failure to apply the relevant 
provisions. It is put forward that limiting clauses should be narrowly construed and most 
restrictions discarded altogether. 
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Introduction 
The  purpose  of  international  human  rights  law  is  to  protect  basic 
individual rights and provide to the victims of human rights violations legal 
remedies against the authors of the abuses. One major difficulty faced by the 
TEMIDA 
Mart 2014, str. 29-46 
ISSN: 1450-6637 
DOI: 10.2298/TEM1401029R  
Pregledni rad 
Primljeno: 28.1.2014. 
Odobreno za štampu: 15.3.2014.
*  Dr  Axelle  Reiter  is  lecturer  (adjunct  professor),  in  International  Law,  at  the  Faculty  of 
Economics of Verona University (Vicenza), and researcher at the European University Institute 
(Firenze). E-mail: axelle.reiter@eui.euAxelle Reiter
30
victims in this context originates in the limiting clauses that states insert in 
international conventions. This paper looks at their compatibility with human 
rights agreements, in the view of strengthening the legal avenues open to 
the victims and the possibility for them to obtain redress. While restrictive 
clauses can be found in most treaties, the specific object and purpose of 
human rights conventions raises particularly acutely the question of their 
validity. The raison d’être of any such instrument is the protection of individual 
rights. They do not benefit to states or organise arbitration for the conflicts 
which arise among them. Adherence to their object and purpose is, therefore, 
incompatible with state-centric restrictions. Reluctance to admit any limitation 
to these conventions is substantiated by their erga omnes and emerging ius 
cogens status (Reiter, 2008). The duties that international human rights law 
creates for states can be sanctioned by the entire international community. 
The crucial position of human rights at the core of the notion of international 
public order conditions the approach to adopt in relation to most issues 
that touch upon the scope and substance of protected rights, including 
withdrawal from treaties, reservations, implied limitations, overtly broad or 
inappropriate restrictions, misguided interpretations, failure to apply the 
relevant provisions and their violation. The paper is divided in four sections. 
The first classifies the different types of restrictions and the following three 
assess their admissibility. The second puts forward that treaties not foreseeing 
denunciation are immunised against it. Withdrawal from other conventions 
is submitted to strict conditions and its practical consequences are mitigated 
in the presence of other international duties. The third defends that a strict 
application of the test enshrined in the Vienna Convention would result in 
prohibiting reservations not expressly permitted in a treaty. Whereas the 
majority of human rights instruments explicitly authorise reservations, their 
acceptability depends on the specific empowering rules. The fourth argues 
that limiting clauses should be discarded for incompatibility with the aim 
of human rights agreements, with the exception of those motivated by the 
respect of the rights of others. This understanding of human rights restrictions 
would prevent states from denying legal remedies and satisfaction to many 
victims of human rights violations.Temida
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Classification
Different  limitations  are  usually  combined  and  states’  duties  are 
considerably  reduced  cumulatively.  Certain  clauses  are  dubious p e r  s e , 
independently of the kind of agreement in which they are inserted. Besides, 
the nature of human rights norms disqualifies some additional limitations. 
Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that 
“a treaty shall be interpreted […] in the light of its object and purpose”. The 
idea lying at the core of any international instrument ought to be insulated 
from adverse attacks in the shape of restrictions. A human rights convention 
is primarily “an instrument for the protection of individual human beings” 
and its terms need to be interpreted in this light: their interpretation should 
facilitate an effective protection of the rights consecrated and “promote 
the ideals and values of a democratic society”,1 here construed as a rights-
respecting  society.  One  can  categorise  restrictive  clauses  according  to 
two criteria, the moment of their insertion in a treaty and the mechanisms 
employed to evade unwanted duties (Virally, 1982: 10-21). 
First, the definition of the scope ratione materiae, personae, temporis or 
loci of a provision and references to indeterminate circumstances always leave 
some cases out of its reach (Dimitrijević, Opsahl, 1999: 642-643). Exceptions 
can be considered to be part of the definition of a rule or concept; leading to 
“the logical emptiness of the idea of an exception as an analytically distinct 
concept” (Schauer, 1991: 891-893). However, definitions and specifications 
are sometimes inserted in a treaty to limit states’ obligations as normally 
construed,  like  denunciations  without  any  delay  or  a  very  strict  non-
retroactivity rule. The use of expressions as “in the measure possible” or “in 
appropriate cases” and the invitation of states to “take into consideration” a 
factor or give it a certain priority are even more flagrant examples. They rely 
on the goodwill of states interpreting them and generate uncertainty about 
the exact content of the rule affected. Second, the insertion of transitory or 
permanent exception expressly excludes some events or hypotheses from the 
application of a treaty’s general principles. Broad and imprecise ones give a 
purely facultative character to the convention. Third, “opting in” or “contracting 
in” clauses create optional obligations, conditioned to a specific acceptation. 
1  ECHR, Klass et al. v. FRG, 6 Sept. 1978, § 34; Soering v. UK, 7 July 1989, § 87; Mamatkulov and 
Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, 6 Feb. 2003, § 93. Axelle Reiter
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This  mechanism  entrenches  a  system  of  multiple  or  variable  geometry 
between member states and runs counter to the very idea of a world public 
order. Fourth, safety or derogation clauses allow the suspension of some 
rights in special circumstances. Chief examples are the adoption of states of 
emergency in truly exceptional situations and the rules preventing the abuse 
of individual rights to destroy the liberty of others. Fifth, states can rely on 
“potestative” clauses, which annihilate a disposition by tying it to a condition 
whose realisation will depend on their own will or actions. Reservations 
relying on conformity with domestic laws, honour or vital national interests, 
and exceptions defined in so vague and subjective terms that they allow 
states to interpret them as they wish to belong to this category. They are 
particularly pernicious because they empty an article of its content. As a result, 
“potestative” or automatic reservations are considered invalid.2
Limitations are introduced in the text of a treaty during its elaboration, 
in reservations before its approval or during its execution. The insertion of 
restrictions during the drafting of an agreement does not pose a problem 
per se. Their acceptability depends on the type of limitation chosen, its aim, 
content, degree of precision and conformity with the object of the treaty. 
One should always question the validity of open-ended or vague definitions 
and  characterisations,  wide  or  nebulous  exceptions  and  “potestative”’ 
clauses. Bringing in restrictive clauses unilaterally through reservations is a 
more  contentious  move  and  often  leads  to  conflicts.  The  incorporation 
of limitations by reliance on excuses during the implementation of a treaty 
already in force is even more problematic. When executing an international 
convention, states may limit their obligations by interpretation or by the 
invocation of domestic impediments, the rebus sic standibus principle, material 
impossibility or force majeure. The introduction of limitations at this stage can 
be avoided by the submission of disagreements to international arbitrage or 
a supervisory body. Otherwise, national authorities remain the competent 
organs to elucidate unclear articles. Yet, municipal rules cannot prevail over 
international agreements and limiting international duties on their basis is 
always inadmissible. Ultimately, an extreme solution open to governments is 
simply to denounce a treaty whose terms cannot be reconciled with states’ 
practice or domestic rules. 
2  ICJ, Fisheries Jurisdiction, Jurisdiction of the Court, 4 Dec. 1998, p. 467, § 86; Certain Norwegian 
Loans, Preliminary Objections, 6 July 1957, H. Lauterpacht, Individual Opinion, pp. 48-50; 
Interhandel, Preliminary Objections, 21 Mar. 1959, H. Lauterpacht, Individual Opinion.Temida
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Denunciation
The validity of denunciations needs to be scrutinised with particular 
attention, due to their final character. Article 56 of the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties declares that “a treaty which contains no provision 
regarding  its  termination  and  which  does  not  provide  for  denunciation 
or  withdrawal  is  not  subject  to  denunciation  or  withdrawal  unless  it  is 
established that the parties intended to admit [such a possibility] or [it] may 
be implied by the nature of the treaty”. This rule applies to all international 
agreements. The ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the ICCPR Second Optional Protocol 
do  not  contain  any  such  provision  and  cannot  be  denounced.  Such  a 
possibility was never suggested during the drafting of the two Covenants, 
or the Second Optional Protocol, and does not derive from the nature of 
these treaties; quite the contrary. Both Covenants were adopted by the same 
General Assembly resolution as the First Optional Protocol, which allows 
denunciation.3 The Human Rights Committee has recognised the illegality 
of denouncing the ICCPR and its Second Optional Protocol in a general 
comment on the continuity of states’ obligations. The general comment 
evokes the customary rule in Article 56, before specifying that states parties 
did not envisage the possibility of denouncing the Covenant. This “was not 
a mere oversight on their part”, as Article 41 § 2 enables states to withdraw 
their acceptance of the Committee’s competence to look at communications 
introduced by other parties. Besides, “the same conclusion applies to the 
Second Optional Protocol in the drafting of which a denunciation clause was 
deliberately omitted” and whose Article 6 § 1 declares that its provisions are 
to be considered additional dispositions to the Covenant. In relation to the 
second exception in Article 56, the Human Rights Committee underlines that 
the two international covenants formalise the rights already protected in the 
Universal Declaration and constitute an “International Bill of Human Rights”; 
hence, their nature is far from temporary. Individual rights devolve with the 
land and their beneficiaries can never be deprived of these rights.4 As a matter 
of logic and consistency, the same conclusion applies to the CEDAW, the two 
Additional Protocols to the Inter-American Convention on Human Right, and 
3  ICCPR Optional Protocol No 1, Article 12; UN General Assembly, Resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 Dec. 
1966.
4  HR Committee, General Comment No 26 (61) on Continuity of Obligations, 6 Dec. 1997.Axelle Reiter
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the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; which do not contain any 
denunciation clause either. 
Withdrawal from the protocols to the European Convention on Human 
Rights is more complex. The protocols that introduce new rights include 
an attachment or integration clause, stipulating that their provisions are 
supplementary dispositions to the European Convention.5 A denunciation of 
the Convention would lead to an automatic denunciation of the protocols 
but they could not be denounced separately, since they are integrated in 
the same legal corpus from the moment of their ratification.6 Moreover, the 
European Convention on Human Rights can only be denounced in its entirety 
and not article by article, or paragraph by paragraph (Imbert, 1995: 951). 
Most other human rights conventions expressly permit denunciations, after a 
notification period varying from several months to one year. The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and their two Additional Protocols restrict the possibility for 
states to withdraw from these treaties in time of armed conflict.7 In addition, 
the denunciation of the Geneva Conventions does not affect their obligation 
to respect the principle of humanity, entrenched in the Martens Clause; which 
belongs to customary international law or, at least, to the corpus of general 
principles of international law.8 The possibility to denounce human rights 
conventions is largely restricted in practice. Indeed, “the denunciation of a 
treaty does not in any way impair the duty of the denouncing state to fulfil 
an obligation embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under 
international law independently of the treaty” (Schwelb, 1976: 282). States 
remain bound to respect the rights protected under other conventions or 
general international law. 
Due to the customary and emerging ius cogens nature of human rights 
provisions, the denunciation of treaties protecting individual rights would 
not  considerably  affect  states’  duties  in  practice.  It  would  only  cancel 
their  submission  to  international  systems  of  reporting,  monitoring  and 
5  ECvHR Protocol No 1, Article 5; Protocol No 4, Article 6 § 1; Protocol No 6, Article 6; Protocol 
No 7, Article 7 § 1; Protocol No 12, Article 3; Protocol No 13, Article 5. 
6  ECHR, Belgian Linguistic Case, 23 July 1968, p. 30, § 1; Kjeldsen et al. v. Denmark, 7 Dec. 1976, p. 
26, § 52; Abdulaziz et al. v. UK, 28 May 1985, p. 31, § 60.
7  GC I, Article 63, al. 3-4; GC II, Article 62, al. 3-4; GC III, Article 142, al. 3-4; GC IV, Article 158, al. 
3-4; AP I, Article 99 § 1; AP II, Article 25 § 1.
8  ICJ, Corfu Channel, 9 Apr. 1949, p. 22; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 July 
1996, § 84.Temida
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adjudication, not the necessity to protect any right. Following Article 44 § 1 of 
the Vienna Convention, states cannot withdraw from supervisory mechanisms 
unless they denounce the treaty. One may judge these mechanisms an 
integral and non-dissociable part of the rights guaranteed, which would de 
facto consecrate the opposability of the entire treaty to denouncing states 
(de Frouville, 2004: 510). The Inter-American Commission considers that “a 
unilateral action by a state cannot divest an international court of jurisdiction 
that it has already asserted” and that “the American Convention contains no 
provision that would make it possible to withdraw recognition of the Court’s 
contentious jurisdiction, as such a provision would be antithetical to the 
Convention and have no foundation in law”.9 The Court endorses this vision: 
“the only avenue the state has to disengage itself from the Court’s binding 
contentious jurisdiction is to denounce the Convention as a whole”, with one 
year advance notice. To this effect, it also relies on the specificity of human 
rights instruments and on Article 29 (a) of the Convention, which rules that “no 
provision of this convention shall be interpreted as permitting any state party, 
group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and 
freedoms recognised in this convention or to restrict them to a greater extent 
than is provided for”. Authorising the denunciation of optional clauses would 
go against the object and purpose of the treaty, by depriving individuals of 
the guarantees offered by monitoring arrangements, and violate the rule that 
pacta sunt servanda.10  
The OAS Charter requires that all member states comply with the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man: it is “indirectly binding” because 
it reveals the rights guaranteed in the Charter.11 Governments denouncing the 
Inter-American Convention remain bound by the Declaration. This construction 
9  ACHR, Aguirre Roca et al. v. Peru, 24 Sept. 1999, § 24; Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, 24 Sept. 1999, § 24; 
Aguirre Roca et al. v. Peru, 31 Jan. 2001, § 20; Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, 6 Feb. 2001, § 29.
10  ACHR, Aguirre Roca et al. v. Peru, 24 Sept. 1999, §§ 33-53; Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, 24 Sept. 1999, 
§§ 34-54; Aguirre Roca et al. v. Peru, 31 Jan. 2001, § 21; Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, 6 Feb. 2001, § 31; 
Barrios Altos v. Peru, 14 May 2001, § 27.
11  OAS General Assembly, Resolution 314 (VII-O/77), 22 June 1977; Resolution 371 (VIII-O/78), 1 July 
1978; ACHR, Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within 
the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 14 July 1989, §§ 
42- 43 and 45; Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, 17 Sept. 2003, §§ 56-57 and 
60; I-ACHR, Potter, White et al. v. US, 6 Mar. 1981, §§ 15-16; James Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton 
v. US, 22 Sept. 1987, §§ 45-48; Michael Edwards et al. v. Bahamas, 4 Apr. 2001; Detainees in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 13 Mar. 2002.Axelle Reiter
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applies mutatis mutandis to the denunciation of other human rights treaties. 
States parties remain bound by the human rights enshrined in the constitutive 
charter of the relevant international organisation even after withdrawing 
from  their  conventional  obligations.  At  the  global  level,  this  consecrates 
the rights in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration. The 
existence of a general principle of irreversibility in international constitutive 
statutes has equally been defended, with the result that denunciation would 
not relieve states from respecting fundamental rights (de Frouville, 2004: 
500). Some authors also view the denunciation of a convention “as a series of 
reservations on all provisions of [this] treaty”. As a result, withdrawal from an 
international agreement would be subjected to the same timing constraints as 
reservations and need to be adopted at the moment of its signature, accession 
to, or ratification (Garrigues, Kroke, Weissbrodt, 1998: 233). Yet, while this 
theory has the merit to prevent states from opting out of their international 
obligations,  the  initial  assimilation  between  denunciation  and  multiple 
reservations is analytically farfetched. Last but not least, the type of escape 
clauses used is not fully determinative of the validity of limitations. The reasons 
why public authorities invoke them also matter and human rights treaties 
enable international organs to control the aim and extent of restrictions. 
Denunciations cannot cover abusive practices, like backdoor adoption of late 
reservations under the guise of withdrawal and re-accession.12 
Reservations 
Following Article 2 § 1 (d) of the Vienna Convention, reservations are 
limitations, which are neither inserted in the text of an agreement during 
its elaboration nor applicable to all parties to the accord but are unilaterally 
added by some signatories at the moment of approval or ratification of the 
treaty.  This  creates  some  problems  at  a  purely  contractual  level,  like  the 
imbalance of obligations between member states. Articles 19 to 23 of the 
Vienna Convention regulate the acceptability of reservations and their effects. 
As a rule, all reservations are permitted, unless a treaty forbids them or merely 
accepts those it expressly recognises. Examples of explicit prohibitions have 
12  HR Committee, Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, 2 Nov. 1999.Temida
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been inserted in many human rights treaties. 13 Reservations not specifically 
outlawed are only valid as long as they are not “incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the treaty”.  The purpose and object test has several corollaries. 
Reservations need to affect the particular article to which they are attached, not 
other norms, and states cannot restrict the scope of provisions not allowing any 
reservations or modify their content by pretending that said reservations affect 
another disposition. Such a fiction can a fortiori not circumvent an interdiction 
grounded in another treaty or general international law: customary norms, “by 
their very nature, must have equal force for all members of the international 
community, and cannot therefore be the subject of any right of unilateral 
exclusion exercisable at will by any one of them in its own favour”;14 “no right 
is conferred to make unilateral reservations to articles which are declaratory 
of established principles of international law” and “customary rules belonging 
to the category of ius cogens cannot be subjected to unilateral reservations”. 15 
Reservations to these norms will always be quashed as null and void.16 In 
addition, reservations valid at the time of their formulation will not necessarily 
remain so with the passing of time. Questioning the continuing legality of 
reservations is particularly relevant in the case of human rights instruments, due 
to the principles of progressive effectiveness of these treaties and irreversibility 
or intangibility of individual rights. Reservations must be withdrawn after a 
reasonable delay, needed to adopt necessary modifications of conflicting 
municipal rules and practice, and permanent ones are invalid.17 In a nutshell, 
reservations merely “allow a state to give itself, as a purely temporary measure, 
‘at the time of’ the signature or ratification of the Convention, a brief space in 
which to bring into line any laws ‘then in force in its territory’ which do not yet 
sufficiently respect and protect the fundamental rights recognised”.18 
The  acceptability  of  any  reservation  to  agreements  aiming  at  the 
construction of a common public order is highly questionable, due to the 
13  See, for a total ban on reservations: Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 
Article 9; Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Article 9; European Convention for 
the Prevention of Torture, Article 21; ECvHR Protocol No 6, Article 4; Protocol No 13, Article 3; 
CEDAW Optional Protocol, Article 17.
14  ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf, 20 Feb. 1969, pp. 38-39.
15  ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf, 20 Feb. 1969, Padilla Nervo, Separate Opinion, p. 97.
16  ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf, 20 Feb. 1969, Tanaka, Dissenting Opinion.
17  HR Committee, General Comment No 24 (52) on Reservations, 2 Nov. 1994, § 20.
18  ECHR, Belilos v. Switzerland, 29 Apr. 1988, J. De Meyer, Concurring Opinion.Axelle Reiter
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irreconcilable opposition between the ‘objective’ character of integral treaties 
and the reciprocity principle at the root of the reservation system (Dupuy, 
2003: 145-146). The erga omnes nature of human rights instruments casts 
doubt on the admissibility of any one-sided curtailment of these norms 
and, following the object and purpose test, reservations to the protection 
of basic rights can be considered illegal per se. In effect, “it may even be 
thought that such reservations, and the provisions permitting them, are 
incompatible with the ius cogens and therefore null and void, unless they 
relate  only  to  arrangements  for  implementation,  without  impairing  the 
actual substance of the rights in question”.19 Far from being divorced from 
the Vienna Convention, this solution adjusts its criteria to the specific aims 
of international human rights law. The compatibility of any reservation not 
explicitly foreseen in the text of human rights treaties is doubtful. However, 
most human rights agreements contain dispositions that specifically provide 
for reservations. In such cases, the admissibility of reservations will have to be 
analysed, in each instance, according to the rules inserted in the convention 
and the need to respect the irreducible core of the treaty. Moreover, state 
practice and international organs generally recognise the admissibility of 
unforeseen reservations to human rights instruments. Although this position 
is regrettable, supervisory bodies are competent to interpret international 
agreements and their view on what contradicts their aim is binding, since 
determining the object and purpose of a convention is “a preliminary legal 
issue to be solved as a matter of treaty interpretation” (Coccia, 1985: 24; 
Lijnzaad, 1995: 41, 91). A respectful supervision of humanitarian treaties still 
suggests a stricter monitoring of the situation and the refusal of reservations 
not expressly permitted. Lastly, “when a treaty is a constituent instrument of 
an international organisation and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation 
requires  the  acceptance  of  the  competent  organ  of  that  organisation”. 
Following Article 20 § 3 of the Vienna Convention, reservations to human 
rights instruments cannot be adopted without the consent of international 
monitoring  organs.  This  would  pertain  to  regional  conventions  and  UN 
agreements assorted of treaty bodies, with the exception of the ICESCR whose 
supervisory committee was not created in the treaty itself. The supervisory 
organs of these treaties could refuse any reservation they dislike, without 
further motivation.
19  ECHR, Belilos v. Switzerland, 29 Apr. 1988, J. De Meyer, Concurring Opinion.Temida
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Compatibility with the aim of the conventions  
and ban on abuses of power
The aim of human rights treaties is the enhancement of the fundamental 
rights of each and every single human being qua human being. In this view, 
the rights of a person may only be, legally and legitimately, infringed in 
order to guarantee the competing rights of others. Conversely, the reliance 
of municipal courts or legislation on purely external motives never qualifies. 
A more restriction-permissive understanding would conflict with the object 
and purpose of human rights instruments. The insertion of clauses relative 
to  public  order  or  policy,  public  safety  and  national  security  in  human 
rights  treaties  has  been  sharply  criticised  as  factors  of  vagueness  and 
uncertainty, grounds for far-reaching limitations and menaces in the shape 
of unreasonable restrictions (Daes, 1983: 121, 177). Whereas one might claim 
that all legal norms are somewhat vague and vulnerable to interpretation, 
these concepts are particularly prone to divergent readings and abuses by 
state actors. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stigmatises “the 
difficulty inherent in the attempt of defining with precision” such notions and 
emphasises that they “may under no circumstances be invoked as a means 
of denying a right guaranteed by the Convention or to impair or deprive it of 
its true content”, in breach of Article 29 (a) of the Convention.20 The concept 
of morals is equally uncertain and varies widely both in time and space.21 
Its recognition would grant an extremely large margin of appreciation to 
state authorities and undermine any meaningful international control of its 
application, which makes it an even greater jeopardy to the rights it affects. 
The  specificity  of  the  safety  clauses  is  crucial  in  that  their  goal  is 
compatible with the aim of human rights instruments. While other types of 
limitations purports to minimise states’ obligations, the safety clauses are 
meant to guarantee in fine a wider application of individual rights. These rules 
include the derogating clauses sensu stricto, which allow the suspension of 
some dispositions in states of emergency or in the presence of abusive uses 
of rights, and ‘claw-back’ clauses protecting the rights of others. The existence 
20  ACHR, Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, 
13 Nov. 1985, § 67; The Word ‘Laws’ in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 9 
May 1986, § 31.
21  ECHR, Handyside v. UK, 7 Dec. 1976, § 48; HR Committee, Hertzberg et al. v. Finland, 2 Apr. 1982, 
T. Opsahl, R. Lallah and W.S. Tarnopolsky, Individual Opinion.Axelle Reiter
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and the survival of a genuinely democratic state are the first conditions of the 
respect of human rights. The prevalence of the normality of a legal order over 
the life of the nation may, in emergency situations, lead to the annihilation 
of this democratic society, or to a substantial and sometimes irreparable 
damage. Such emergencies may also ruin the very basis of the subsistence of 
human rights. Under these circumstances, the preservation of the shell may 
become vital to ensure the life of its contents; claiming a priority over the 
strict application of some individual rights. In this perspective, the European 
Commission  of  Human  Rights  has  declared  that  the  ultimate  aim  of  all 
restrictions is the protection of a democratic social order and the rule of law.22 
Even this type of restrictions can neither be exercised in an arbitrary or over-
extensive fashion, nor be based on a pure maximisation of the aggregated 
rights of all members of a given society. Safety provisions should comply with 
the conditions and safeguards, listed in the conventions and the case law 
of their supervisory organs, to ensure that measures departing from states’ 
ordinary obligations affect fundamental rights as minimally as possible.23 
The inherent contradiction of restricting a right for the sake of its protection 
appears in any safety-net provision. The only way to secure that this fragile 
balance  is  respected  passes  through  the  establishment  of  supranational 
mechanisms of control. 
The general clauses prohibiting abuses of rights and powers24 are the 
foremost guarantees on which the conventions rest and the decisive test 
of the legitimacy of a restrictive measure. They help in determining if the 
core and essence of international instruments have been respected, ban 
the use of any provision to destroy or limit human rights more than allowed 
and outlaw the exploitation of restrictions for invalid aims. Each and every 
other disposition must be submitted to a check of their conformity with 
these provisions and reinterpreted accordingly. This entails a much more 
radical and activist approach to human rights supervision than is generally 
envisaged, at odds with the margin of appreciation doctrine developed 
by the European Court of Human Rights. Human rights bodies rely on the 
articles forbidding abuses of power as a rule of interpretation to delimit the 
22  EComHR, G v. FRG, req. No 9228/80, 11 May 1984, pp. 22 and 27, §§ 89 and 110.
23  Report of the Meeting of Experts on Rights Not Subject to Derogation during States of Emergency 
and Exceptional Circumstances, 1995, U.N. Doc., E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1995/20, Annex 1, § 5.
24  ECvHR, Articles 17-18; ESC, Article 31 § 2; ICCPR/ICESCR, Article 5 § 1; ACvHR, Articles 29 (a)-30.Temida
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scope of states’ undertakings ratione materiae and ratione loci. The European 
Court of Human Rights judges that, whereas states are allowed “to maintain 
or establish a distinction between criminal law and disciplinary law, and 
to draw the dividing line”, this can only be done in the respect of certain 
conditions and the Court is competent “to satisfy itself that the disciplinary 
does not improperly encroach upon the criminal”.25 Likewise, public agents 
should never infringe internationally protected rights on the territory of 
another state, whether the government of the other country acquiesced or 
was opposed to the violations.26 Besides, the provisions on abuses of power 
rule out larger limitations than those explicitly authorised.27 They serve as a 
directive regarding the appreciation of the necessity of restrictive measures 
“in a democratic society”;28 which implies that states are solely permitted to 
use the least invasive means accessible.29 They proscribe the increase of the 
number of legitimate exceptions listed in any article and permit to invalidate 
the doctrinal theory of implied limitations (Alston, Quinn, 1987: 207). Finally, 
no specific restriction ought to be allowed in the absence of a threat to the 
rights of others. Dispositions mentioning public order, public security or 
morals must be interpreted to include human rights and never extended 
outside the scope of their protection.  
Emergency provisions are only valid as a protection of the population 
of a country or region against graver violations of their basic rights. This 
understanding of states of emergency can be explained on the basis of 
the  technical  conditions  inserted  in  the  derogation  clauses.30  It  outlaws 
derogative measures causing a profound alteration of the existing legal order, 
with the result that fundamental rights would not only be suspended but 
also destroyed (Ergeç, 1987: 181-182), attacks to their core or substance, their 
25  ECHR, Engel et al. v. Netherlands, 8 June 1976, § 81.
26  HR Committee, General Comment No 31 (80) on the Nature of the General Obligations Imposed 
on States Parties to the Covenant (Article 2), 26 May 2004, § 10; López Burgos v. Uruguay, 29 July 
1981, pp. 88-92; Celiberti v. Uruguay, 29 July 1981, pp. 92-94.
27  ECHR, Engel et al. v. Netherlands, Public Hearings, Oct. 1975, F. Ermacora, Intervention, pp. 281-
282.
28  ECHR, Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 Nov. 1980, M. Zekia, Dissenting Opinion.
29  ACHR, Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, 
13 Nov. 1985, § 79.
30  ECvHR, Article 15; ESC, Article 30 ; ICCPR, Article 4; ACvHR, Article 27.Axelle Reiter
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suppression or the total interdiction to exercise them.31 Some basic rights 
should remain untouched in the most dramatic circumstances; giving them 
a privileged position in the architecture of international treaties and priority 
when adjudicating conflicts of rights. States are not allowed to file notices of 
derogation under the emergency clauses to escape from the consequences 
of a judgement or perpetrate a comparable détournement of the articles of 
other international instruments. Derogations not fulfilling the prescriptions of 
the emergency clauses are prohibited, even when justified by circumstances 
whose exceptionality is not foreseen in the suspension rule (Ergeç, 1987: 178-
179). Particular restrictions can never absorb the powers of derogation, in the 
absence of a declaration of emergency; which defeats the creation of ‘quasi-
emergency’ situations in anti-terrorist settings (Harris, O’Boyle, Warbrick, 1995: 
497; Van Dijk, Van Hoof, 1990: 587-588). Lastly, the dispositions on abuses of 
power rule out extraordinary norms in emergencies falling short of war, when 
the national legal system solely admits states of exception to be pronounced 
during armed conflicts,32 and proscribe declarations of emergency in countries 
whose constitution cannot be suspended in time of crisis. 
Conclusion 
Inserting limiting clauses in human rights treaties is a contradiction in terms. 
The most radical way out for states unwilling to comply with their conventional 
duties is the denunciation of the treaty. Article 56 of the Vienna Convention 
precludes exit from the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the Second Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR, the CEDAW, the Protocols to the Inter-American Convention and the 
African Charter. Other agreements do not benefit from such a total protection 
but their denunciation is still submitted to strict conditions, if not forbidden. 
Withdrawal from human rights treaties leaves unaffected states’ obligations 
under other conventions or general international law. Public authorities remain 
bound to protect basic rights, albeit without having to submit themselves 
to international supervisory mechanisms, and even this caveat is becoming 
increasingly contentious, due to the integral and non-dissociable nature of 
31  ECHR, Brogan v. UK, 29 Nov. 1988, §§ 60-61; Sheffield and Horsham v. UK, 30 July 1998, P. Van 
Dijk, Dissenting Opinion, § 8.
32  Belgian Court of Cassation, De Napoles Pacheco v. Minister of Finances, 23 Sept. 1976, J. Velu, 
Conclusions, p. 88.Temida
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human rights instruments. Short of repealing the agreement, states can reduce 
their undertakings through interpretation, invocation of internal obstacles, 
the rebus sic standibus rule, material unfeasibility or force majeure. However, 
international treaties have a higher status and priority over domestic norms. 
Therefore, governments cannot escape from international duties in the name 
of municipal laws or public policies.  
States can introduce unilateral reservations before becoming parties to 
a treaty. A strict application of the test enshrined in the Vienna Convention 
exclude  reservations  not  expressly  permitted  and  treaties  that  allow  a 
particular type of reservations do not admit others. Unhappily, the majority of 
human rights instruments explicitly authorise reservations. The acceptability 
of  reservations  to  these  treaties  depends  on  the  specific  empowering 
rules. Worse, state practice and supervisory organs often admit additional 
reservations. International monitoring bodies have the power to elucidate 
treaty lacunas, obscurities and ambiguities. Their interpretation cannot be 
dismissed and the wording of the conventions needs to be analysed along 
with the views of the competent bodies. A respectful interpretation of these 
conventions still conjures up a more rigorous control of the reservations and 
the interdictin of those not clearly allowed in their text. The European Social 
Charter, the two International Covenants, the African Charter and the Apartheid 
Convention do not mention reservations. The CAT merely permits states to opt 
out of some facultative clauses and does not refer to the possibility of other 
reservations. Subsequently, these instruments must stay free from reservations. 
The opposite decisions taken by several supervisory bodies ought to be 
disapproved of for their lack of activism. The CEDAW, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-
American Convention for the Prevention of Torture and the Additional Protocol 
to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights integrate the purpose and object test of the Vienna 
Convention. In contrast, the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
CERD contain original rules concerning reservations. Yet, these instruments 
remain subordinated to the standards of the Vienna Convention. These two 
categories of treaties can solely accommodate marginal reservations. General, 
vague, unclear and ambiguous reservations are outlawed in any case, as well 
as those affecting core or inalienable rights.
Finally, the scope of international agreements can be limited at the 
drafting stage. This method is not per se problematic but some specific Axelle Reiter
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limitations stay unacceptable. The legality of a restrictive clause depends on 
the kind of limitation it introduces, its motive and ultimate goal, substance, 
extent, precision and compatibility with the aim of the treaty. Ambiguous 
definitions  and  qualifications,  extensive  or  ill-defined  exceptions  and 
‘potestative’ provisions are never valid. Besides, the particular nature and 
status of international human rights law shelter related treaties from any 
limitation not aimed at better protecting individual rights. In this light, most 
limiting provisions should be deemed unlawful and contrary to the aim of the 
agreements. Only restrictions motivated by the respect of the rights of others 
gain legitimacy when this rationale is respected and a series of safeguards 
are established. This narrows the pool of acceptable limitations to individual 
rights and enhances the legal remedies available to the victims of human 
rights violations against the authors of the abuses.
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ax el l e Re i t e R
Žrtve kršenja i ograničavanja ljudskih prava
Svrha međunarodnog prava ljudskih prava je zaštita osnovnih individualnih 
prava  i  obezbeđivanje  pravnih  sredstava  protiv  počinioca  žrtvama  kršenja 
ljudskih prava. Velika teškoća sa kojom se žrtve u ovom kontekstu sreću potiče od 
ograničavajućih klauzula koje države implementiraju u međunarodne konvencije. 
Ovaj rad razmatra njihovu kompatibilnost sa sporazumima o ljudskim pravima, u 
pogledu jačanja pravnih puteva otvorenih žrtvama i njihove mogućnosti da dobiju 
obeštećenje.  Ključni  položaj  ljudskih  prava  u  osnovi  koncepta  međunarodnog 
javnog reda uslovljava usvajanje pristupa u vezi sa većinom pitanja koji se osvrću na 
područje i suštinu zaštićenih prava, uključujući povlačenje iz ugovora, rezervisanost, 
implicirana ograničenja, široka ili neodgovarajuća ograničenja, pogrešna tumačenja, 
neuspeh primene relevantnih odredbi.  Istaknuto je da bi ograničavajuće klauzule 
trebalo uže postavljati i većinu ograničenja odbaciti zajedno.
Ključne reči: ljudska prava, ograničenja, rezervisanost, povlačenje iz ugovora